By Owen Rice
Key Takeaways
- Office distress data is at multi-decade highs: Trepp’s CMBS office delinquency rate has hit levels not seen since the 2008–2010 financial crisis, yet headline-grabbing foreclosures remain rare.
- Lenders, special servicers and borrowers are resolving the vast majority of distressed office loans behind closed doors through extend-and-pretend modifications, loan extensions, friendly foreclosures and deeds-in-lieu.
- CMBS lenders prefer workouts over public foreclosures because foreclosure is slow, expensive, headline-risk, and forces a price discovery the entire CMBS market would rather defer.
- This cycle parallels the early stages of the 2008–2010 GFC and the late-1980s S&L crisis. Both eventually forced repricings, but only after extend-and-pretend ran out of runway.
- For office tenants, the implication is simple: the leverage-shifting reset in pricing is happening, just quietly. Tenants who run a competitive process now can capture the savings.
We get asked this all the time: With more than one-third of all office space sitting vacant in most cities across the country, how are office buildings managing to stay afloat without going into default?
It’s been more than five years since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and large portions of office space remain empty. Many of these buildings are outdated, poorly located or simply no longer meet the needs of modern tenants in a hybrid-work world. They have little to no chance of being released anytime soon.
The Distress is Real, so Where are the Foreclosure Headlines?
According to recent data from Trepp, a leading firm that tracks the performance of commercial real estate loans, delinquency rates for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) reached 7.13% in June 2025. The office sector is under the most stress, with an 11.08% delinquency rate, the highest since December 2024.
For context, CMBS loans are often used to finance large office buildings. Trepp’s data gives insight into which properties and loans are at risk of default, and is closely followed by lenders, investors and real estate professionals. So why haven’t we seen a bigger wave of foreclosures?
How Lenders and Special Servicers Are Quietly Working Through Office Loans
Much of the distressed activity is happening quietly, behind closed doors. Many lenders are working out solutions with borrowers to avoid the messy and very public nature of foreclosure proceedings. In many cases, borrowers are handing back the keys in what’s effectively a “friendly foreclosure” or deed-in-lieu transaction, keeping the default out of the headlines.
Some loans are technically in default, but lenders are reluctant to take back the asset, especially when the outstanding loan balance exceeds the property’s market value. The last thing a bank wants is to inherit a half-empty tower they can’t lease or sell.
We’re already seeing office towers in major cities lose significant value, with some trading hands below the cost of construction. But that’s just the beginning. Many lenders have been granting short-term loan extensions, just as they did during the 2008 financial crisis. The difference this time? Back then, demand for office space eventually returned. Today, the world has changed, and with the widespread adoption of hybrid work, only the most desirable buildings are capturing tenant demand. The “extend and pretend” approach simply doesn’t work in a market this dislocated.
This is a massive market reset, and it’s going to unfold over the next few years. Real estate is cyclical, and demand will return someday, but not until the massive oversupply of office space is brought back into balance with tenant needs. The hard truth is that in nearly every office market, there are buildings where the highest and best use may involve a wrecking ball. While that may sound crass; that’s just the reality.
With a severe housing shortage in most major U.S. cities, repurposing some of these obsolete buildings for residential use could help alleviate pressure on both renters and homeowners.
Meanwhile, there’s a growing pool of opportunistic buyers, investment funds, family offices and private equity firms, sitting on large amounts of dry powder. Many of these groups learned from 2008. They know the best deals are often the ones that never hit the open market. They’re having direct conversations with lenders and special servicers, looking to acquire distressed assets quietly, often just before a foreclosure occurs. As a result, we may not see foreclosure numbers spike the way many expect. That doesn’t mean distress isn’t happening, it is. It’s just being handled differently this time around: more quietly, more strategically and often one-on-one between lenders and buyers.
What This Means for Office Tenants in 2026
For tenants, the most important takeaway is that the absence of foreclosures is not the absence of distress. It is exactly the opposite. The reset in office pricing is happening, through concession packages, free rent stretching to a year or more on longer-term deals, generous tenant improvement allowances, and asking-rent declines that landlord brokers are quick to characterize as “stabilizing.” The savings are real; they are simply being delivered through deal structure rather than public price collapse.
Tenants with leases coming up in the next 12–24 months, or anyone who signed at the 2021–2022 peak and is locked into above-market rent, should be running a competitive market check now. The leverage is genuine, but it doesn’t show up in the headlines. It shows up in the deal.
Frequently Asked Questions
Most distressed office loans are being resolved quietly through workouts rather than public foreclosure. Lenders and CMBS special servicers prefer modifications, maturity extensions, friendly foreclosures and deed-in-lieu transactions because those preserve recovery economics, defer loss recognition and avoid the headline risk and forced price discovery that a public foreclosure auction would trigger. The distress is real, it’s just not on the public foreclosure docket.
“Extend and pretend” describes lenders extending the maturity of a troubled commercial real estate loan, sometimes with rate concessions or interest-only relief, rather than foreclosing or selling the note at a loss. The phrase originated in the 2008–2010 financial crisis, when bank regulators gave institutions latitude to modify CRE loans without immediate adverse classification. The same playbook is running today across office CMBS and bank-held office paper.
Longer than most observers expect. With cooperative borrowers, loan modifications, special-servicer workouts and capital-stack engineering can defer foreclosure for several years even when occupancy and cash flow have collapsed. The eventual outcome depends on whether the asset’s fundamentals recover before extend-and-pretend runs out of runway. The 2008–2010 cycle and the S&L crisis both stretched well beyond initial estimates of how long forbearance could last.
If the asset can’t support a takeout refinance, the borrower and lender typically negotiate one of four outcomes: (1) a maturity extension or modification, (2) a friendly foreclosure or deed-in-lieu transferring the asset to the lender, (3) a recapitalization with fresh sponsor or partner equity, or (4) a discounted note sale. Public foreclosure is the last resort, not the first move. Most distress is resolved through one of the first three.
A special servicer is the firm that manages CMBS loans once they become seriously delinquent or transfer to special servicing. Their fiduciary duty is to maximize recovery for the bondholders. Increasingly, that means negotiated workouts, note sales, modifications and structured handoffs, rather than public foreclosure proceedings. A loan being “in special servicing” does not necessarily mean it will be reported as a foreclosure.
Yes, but the reset typically shows up in transaction structure rather than face rents. Landlords are offering significant concession packages, extended free rent, large tenant improvement allowances and lower annual escalations, to retain or attract tenants without admitting to rent declines on the listing sheet. Tenants who run a competitive process and benchmark net effective rent (not asking rent) capture the savings.




